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Abstract	   This	   paper	   looks	   at	   co-­‐indexing	   in	   pictorial	   narratives	   such	   as	   comics.	  	  Using	  a	  formal-­‐semantic	  model	  of	  the	  content	  of	  pictures,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  depicted	  objects	   are	   existentially	   quantified,	   and	   are	   identified	   post-­‐semantically.	   	   A	   DRT	  model	   for	   pictorial	   narratives	   is	   proposed	   where	   discourse	   referents	   are	  constructed	  as	  areas	  of	  a	  picture.	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  The	   database	   for	   this	   discussion	   consists	   of	   comics	   and	   manga	  without	  words,	   namely	  without	   speech	   bubbles	   thought	   bubbles	  or	   captions.	   	   Those	   are	   wordless	   or	   silent	   comics,	   or	   sourds	   in	  French.	  I	  am	  going	  to	  bring	  out	  analogies	  between	  semantics	  and	  pragmatics	   of	   indexing	   (or	   coreference)	   in	   comics	   and	   the	  semantics	  and	  pragmatics	  of	   indexing	   in	  natural	   language.	   	  Many	  of	   my	   examples	   will	   be	   drawn	   from	   Gon	   by	   Masashi	   Tanaka,	   a	  manga	   series	   that	   portrays	   the	   adventures	   of	   a	   small	   powerful	  dinosaur	  in	  the	  world	  of	  modern	  animals.	  	  There	  are	  twenty-­‐three	  episodes	  in	  Gon,	  and	  the	  images	  on	  the	  right	  are	  from	  the	  start	  of	  Episode	   4,	   Gon	   Goes	   Flying,	   where	   Gon	   joins	   a	   family	   of	   golden	  eagles.	   	   In	   the	   first	   frame	  we	   see	   the	  mother	  eagle	   flying	   toward	  the	  cliff	  where	  her	  nest	  is	  located.	  The	  next	  image	  shows	  the	  nest	  with	   four	   baby	   eagles	   and	  Gon,	  who	   has	   decided	   to	   be	   an	   eagle.	  	  Then	  we	   see	   the	  baby	  eagles	  opening	   their	  beaks	  and	   the	  mother	  eagle	   flying	   in,	   carrying	   fish	   in	   the	  mouth	  and	  claws.	   	   	   She	  hovers	  over	  the	  nest	  and	  drops	  the	  fish	  into	  the	  mouths	  of	  the	  babies.	  	  On	  the	   next	   page	   (not	   reproduced	   here)	   the	   babies	   eat	   the	   fish,	   fall	  asleep,	  and	  the	  mother	  flies	  off.	  	  The	  drawings	  of	  Tanaka	  are	  realistic	  drawings	  of	  modern	  animals	  and	   their	   habitat.	   Both	   the	   eagles	   and	   the	   nest	   in	   these	   drawings	  look	  similar	   to	  what	   is	   seen	   in	  photos	  of	  young	  golden	  eagles	  and	  their	  nests.	   	   	  The	  stories	  are	  wordless	  except	  for	  the	  title	  page	  and	  the	  final	  page	  which	  names	  some	  of	  the	  species	  that	  participate	  in	  the	  story,	  in	  this	  case	  the	  golden	  eagle	  and	  the	  bobcat.	  	  	  Comics	   consist	   of	   frames	   or	   panels	   which	   are	   laid	   out	   two-­‐dimensionally	   on	   the	  page.	   	   The	   images	   at	   the	   top	   right	   on	   the	  next	   page	   illustrate	   for	   frames	  27-­‐36	  of	  Episode	   4	   that	   the	   two-­‐dimensional	   layout	   is	   parsed	   into	   a	   linear	   sequence.	   	   The	  parsing	   (which	   is	   arguably	   analogous	   to	  phonological	   parsing	   in	   language)	   can	  be	  formalized	  as	  a	  process	  recursive	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  division	  (T.	  Tanaka	  et.	  al.	  2007,	  Cohn	  2008).	  
2.	  Geometrical	  semantics	  for	  pictures	  In	   philosophy	   there	   is	   a	   debate	   about	   the	   semantics	   of	  pictures.	   	   	   In	  an	  approach	  developed	  by	  Nelson	  Goodman	  in	  
Languages	   of	   Art,	   pictures	   are	   made	   up	   of	   symbols	   with	  conventional	   arbitrary	   content,	   similarly	   to	   the	   lexicon,	  syntax,	   and	   semantics	   of	   language	   (Goodman	   1968).	  	  According	   to	   C.S.	   Peirce,	   a	   picture	   P	  accurately	  depicts	  a	  scene	  σ	  if	  and	  only	  if	  P	  is	  similar	   to	   σ	   with	   respect	   to	   a	   certain	   set	   of	  features.	   	   According	   to	   the	   geometrical	  account	  of	  the	  semantics	  of	  pictures,	  a	  picture	  
P	  accurately	  depicts	  a	  scene	  σ	  if	  and	  only	  P	  is	  obtained	  from	  σ	  via	  a	  geometrical	  transformation,	  P	  =	  G(σ).	  An	  example	  of	  G	  is	  linear	  perspective,	   but	   there	   are	   other	   possible	   transformations.	   	   	   The	   geometrical	  approach	   is	   familiar	   from	   studies	   of	   perspective	   projection	   (e.g.	   Hagen	   1986,	  Bärtschi	   1994).	   	   In	   philosophical	   research	   it	   has	   been	   elaborated	   as	   a	   formalized	  semantics	  for	  pictures	  (Greenberg	  2011).	  	  	  The	   diagram	   below	   from	   Greenberg	   illustrates	   perspectival	   geometrical	  transformation.	   	   We	   have	   a	   scene	   which	   containts	   a	   gray	   cube	   that	   we	   want	   to	  project	  to	  a	  picture.	  	  We	  do	  it	  by	  choosing	  a	  viewpoint,	  which	  is	  the	  red	  circle,	  and	  a	  picture	  plane	  A.	  	  To	  make	  the	  drawing,	  one	  draws	  projection	  lines	  from	  points	  in	  the	  scene	   to	   the	   viewpoint,	   and	  make	   red	  marks	  where	   the	   projection	   lines	   cross	   the	  picture	  plane.	  	  The	  result	  in	  this	  case	  is	  the	  picture	  on	  the	  right	  in	  the	  diagram:	  the	  cube	  is	  depicted	  as	  a	  square.	  
	  The	  next	  diagram	  (also	  quoted	  from	  Greenberg)	  shows	  that	  if	  one	  puts	  the	  picture	  plane	  in	  different	  places,	  one	  gets	  different	  pictures.	  The	  square	  can	  be	  smaller	  as	  in	  B,	  shifted	  up	  as	  in	  C,	  or	  by	  tilting	  the	  plane	  you	  can	  get	  the	  trapezoid	  shape	  D.	  	  Just	  like	  the	  square	  A,	  all	  these	  are	  perspective	  drawings	  of	  a	  cube.	  
	  
I	   mentioned	   that	   linear	   perspective	   is	  only	   one	   kind	   of	   transformation.	   Some	  painters	   draw	   what	   looks	   like	   realistic	  pictures	   without	   using	   linear	  perspective.	   	   On	   the	   next	   page	   is	   a	  painting	   of	   Yehuda	  Halevi	   street	   in	   Tel	  Aviv	   by	   Shalom	   Flash.	   	   The	   building	   to	  the	   right	   curves	   in	   towards	   the	   top.	  	  This	   curving	   effect	   results	   when	   the	  scene	   is	   projected	   onto	   a	   part	   of	   a	  sphere,	   rather	   than	   a	   plane.	   	   Then	   the	  sphere	  drawing	  is	  flattened	  out.	  Greenberg	  (2011)	  discusses	  spherical	  projection	  as	  an	  argument	  against	  a	  similarity	  account	  of	  the	  semantics	  of	  pictures.	  	  It	  also	  tends	  to	   support	   the	   applicability	   of	   geometrical	   semantics	   to	   a	   variety	   of	   drawing	   and	  painting	  styles,	  including	  Flash’s.	  	  An	  interesting	  example	  of	  formalized	  geometrical	  transformations	  is	  what	  is	  called	  non-­‐realistic	   rendering	   in	   computer	   graphics.	   	   Algorithmic	   models	   of	   image	  generation	  use	  three-­‐diminensional	  models	  encoded	  in	  data	  types,	  and	  varieties	  of	  projection	   to	   generate	   images.	   	   They	   may	   include	   transformations	   that	   produce	  styles	   of	   painting	   and	  drawing	   such	   as	   the	  Monet's	   haystack	   on	   the	   left	   below,	   or	  pen-­‐and-­‐ink	  drawing	  at	  the	  right.	  	  Even	  if	  the	  added	  transformations	  are	  defined	  at	  a	  two-­‐dimensional	  level,	  they	  can	  be	  inverted	  to	  obtain	  the	  semantics	  for	  a	  picture	  as	  a	   set	   of	   pairs	   of	   viewpoints	   and	   situations.	   	   This	   supports	   the	   applicability	   of	   a	  geometrical	   formal	  semantics	  also	  to	   images	  such	  as	  comics.	  (These	   images	  are	  by	  Barbara	  Meier	   on	   the	   left	   and	   by	   Jörg	  Hamel	   on	   the	   right.	   Quoted	   from	  Reynolds	  2003).	  	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	  	  The	  statement	  of	  geometric	  projection	  above	  refers	  to	  a	  viewpoint	  in	  addition	  to	  a	  described	  situation.	  	  This	  can	  be	  introduced	  into	  the	  semantics	  in	  several	  ways;	  one	  is	   to	   take	   the	   semantics	   of	   a	   picture	   to	   be	   a	   set	   of	   pairs	   of	   a	   viewpoint	   and	   a	  situation.	   	   See	  Greenberg	   (2011)	   for	  discussion	  of	   additional	  options.	  Formula	   (1)	  uses	   a	   geometric	   transformation	  G,	   an	   artistic	   transformation	  A,	   and	   a	   viewpoint	  parameter	  v	  to	  define	  a	  semantic	  value	  of	  a	  picture.	  	  v	  is	  assumed	  to	  encode	  also	  the	  picture	  plane.	  	  (1) ! = !,σ ! ! σ = ! 	  	  	  The	  semantic	  value	  of	  a	  picture	  P	  is	  the	  set	  of	  pairs	  of	  viewpoints	  v	  and	  situations	  σ	  such	  that	  σ	  projects	  to	  picture	  P	  with	  respect	  to	  viewpoint	  v.	  	  This	  semantic	  value	  is	  similar	   to	   the	   centered	   propositions	   that	   are	   used	   in	   Lewis’s	   account	   of	   de	   se	  attitudes	   (Lewis	   1979).	   	   The	   construction	   does	   not	   have	   to	   do	   with	   agents	   or	  
attitudes	  though,	  and	  the	  pictorial	  modality	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  circumstantial	  rather	  than	  epistemic.	  	  	  If	  we	  want	  to	  compare	  the	  discourse	  pragmatics	  of	  natural	  language	  to	  the	  discourse	  pragmatics	  of	   silent	   comics,	   this	   is	   a	  nice	   setup.	  The	   statement	  of	   semantic	  values	  allows	   us	   to	   reason	   formally	   about	   the	   semantics	   and	   pragmatics	   of	   pictures.	  Because	  the	  basic	  semantic	  values	  are	  so	  similar	  to	  what	  is	  used	  in	  natural	  language	  semantics,	  we	  can	  compare	  what	  happens	  in	  the	  two	  domains.	  There	   are	   other	   things	  which	   are	   represented	  by	   comic	   images	  which	  are	  not	  covered	  by	  projection	  semantics.	  	  In	  Gon	  we	  often	  see	  impact	  coronas	  like	  the	  one	  in	  the	  picture	  on	  the	  right	  where	  Gon	  kicks	  a	  little	  eagle	  and	  the	  corona	  represents	  the	  occurrence	  of	   an	   impact.	   	   Here	   projection	   is	   involved	   in	   determining	   the	  location	   of	   the	   impact,	   but	   the	   outline	   of	   the	   impact	   picture	   is	   not	  determined	  by	  projection.	  	  	  Tanaka	  also	  makes	  frequent	  use	  of	  various	  kinds	   of	  motion	   lines,	   such	   as	   the	   ghost	   lines	   in	   the	   kicking	  picture,	  and	   the	   lines	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   motion	   in	   the	   three	   panels	   on	   the	  right.	  	  	  These	  devices	  seem	  to	  involve	  projection,	  but	  at	  more	  than	  one	  time	   point.	   	   Clearly	   impact	   coronas	   and	   motion	   lines	   require	  extensions	  in	  the	  denotational	  framework.	  But	  the	  point	  is	  orthogonal	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  not	  discuss	  it	  further	  here.	  	  
3.	  Indexing	  and	  (in)definiteness	  I	   now	   turn	   to	   the	   topic	   of	   indexing.	   	   In	   Episode	   4	   of	  Gon	   there	   is	   a	  passage	  where	  Gon	  kicks	  a	   little	  eagle	  which	  starts	  bouncing	  down	  a	  cliff,	  as	  depicted	  in	  the	  first	  four	  panels	  on	  the	  right.	   	   	  Then	  we	  see	  a	  bobcat	   opening	   his	   mouth,	   and	   the	   bobcat	   jumps	   towards	   the	   little	  eagle.	   	  These	  are	  panels	  31	  through	  36	  in	  the	  episode.	   	  In	  denotional	  models,	  we	  get	  satisfaction	  conditions	  along	  the	  following	  lines:	    	  (2) σ31	  atisfies	  P31	  only	  if	  in	  σ31	  a	  small	  dinosaur	  kicks	  a	  small	  eagle.	  	  This	  is	  not	  complete	  satisfaction	  condition,	  because	  the	  picture	  places	  further	  constrains	  on	  the	  geometric	  configuration	  of	  the	  dinosaur	  and	  eagle.	  	  This	  is	  why	  I	  say	  “only	  if”.	  	  	  There	  is	  another	  issue	  which	  I	  will	  mainly	  gloss	  over	  here.	  	  	  The	  literal	   content	   of	   the	   picture	   according	   to	   projection	   theory	   does	   not	   entail	   that	  there	  is	  a	  real	  little	  eagle	  in	  the	  described	  situation.	  	  It	  could	  be	  a	  statue	  of	  an	  eagle,	  or	   a	   picture	   of	   an	   eagle,	   or	   many	   other	   things.	   	   The	   satisfaction	   condition	   (3)	   is	  somewhat	  more	  correct.	  	  (3) σ31	  	  satisfies	  P31	  only	  if	  in	  σ31	  there	  is	  an	  impact	  between	  the	  moving	  leg	  part	  of	  a	  dinosaur-­‐shaped	  thing	  and	  a	  small	  moving	  eagle-­‐shaped	  thing.	  	  For	  the	  next	  frame	  32,	  we	  get	  a	  condition	  along	  these	  lines:	  	  
(4) σ32	  satisfies	  P32	  only	  if	  in	  σ32	  a	  small	  eagle-­‐shaped	  thing	  bounces	  down	  a	  cliff-­‐shaped	  surface.	  	  In	   these	   satisfaction	   conditions	   that	   come	   out	   of	   the	   denotational	   semantics,	   the	  eagle,	  dinosaur,	  and	  cliff	  surface	  are	  existentially	  quantified.	  	  As	  a	  result,	  nothing	  in	  the	  semantics	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  eagle	  in	  σ31	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  eagle	  in	  σ32.	  	  So	  in	  the	  basic	   semantic	  model,	   the	   panel	   sequence	  P31,	  P32	   does	   not	   carry	   the	   information	  that	  the	  eagle	  that	  is	  kicked	  is	  the	  eagle	  that	  bounces	  down.	  	  	  To	  see	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  helpful	   to	   be	   more	   specific	   about	   how	   the	   described	   situation	   σ31	   relates	   to	   the	  described	  situation	  σ32.	   	   	  We	  can	  say	  that	  a	  described	  situation	  for	  the	  sequence	  of	  pictures	  P31,P32	  is	  a	  situation	  that	  contains	  σ31	  and	  σ32	  as	  subparts,	  perhaps	  with	  an	  additional	   constraint	   that	   σ31	   temporally	   precedes	   σ32.	   	   Then	   we	   get	   this	   partial	  satisfaction	  condition:	  	  (5) σ	  satisfies	  P31,P32	  only	   if	  σ	  has	  a	  part	  σ31	  such	   that	   in	  σ31	   there	   is	  an	   impact	  between	  the	  moving	  leg	  part	  of	  a	  dinosaur-­‐shaped	  thing	  and	  a	  small	  moving	  eagle-­‐shaped	  thing,	  and	  σ	  has	  a	  part	  σ32	  such	  that	  in	  σ32	  an	  eagle-­‐shaped	  thing	  bounces	  down	  a	  cliff-­‐shaped	  surface.	  	  Thus	  the	  information	  in	  P31	  and	  P32	  gets	  combined	  by	  summing	  described	  situations	  and	   conjoining	   conditions	   on	   the	   situations.	   In	   (5),	   there	   are	   two	   existential	  quantifiers	  for	  eagles,	  and	  the	  witnesses	  for	  these	  quantifiers	  could	  be	  different.	  	  So	  in	  a	  situation	  that	  satisfies	  the	  combined	  condition,	  the	  eagle	  that	  is	  kicked	  could	  be	  different	  from	  the	  eagle	  that	  bounces	  down.	  	  	  Clearly	  though,	  Tanaka	  intends	  for	  us	  to	  understand	  that	  they	  are	  the	  same,	  and	  readers	  understand	  the	  story	  in	  this	  way.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  compare	  the	  comic	  passage	  with	  paraphrases	  in	  natural	  language	  for	  the	  satisfaction	  conditions	  that	  come	  out	  of	  the	  picture	  semantics.	  	  (6)	  is	  the	  kick	  sequence	  decorated	  with	  English	  paraphrases.	   	  I	  use	  indefinite	  descriptions	  for	  the	  eagle,	  bobcat,	  and	  cliff	  because	  there	  are	  existential	  quantifiers	  in	  (5).	  (6) 	  
	   	  	   	  
As	  an	  English	  passage,	   this	  sequence	  of	  sentences	   is	  disjointed,	  and	   if	  anything	  we	  infer	  that	  the	  eagle	  that	  was	  kicked	  is	  different	   from	  the	  eagle	  that	  bounces	  down.	  	  	  Yet	  the	  semantics	  of	  (6)	  is	  identical	  in	  relevant	  respects	  to	  the	  semantics	  (5)	  of	  the	  picture	  sequence.	  	  The	  difference	  must	  come	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  English,	  a	  passage	  with	  indefinites	  is	  in	  completion	  with	  one	  with	  definites.	  To	  paraphrase	  the	  comic	  as	  it	  is	  naturally	  understood,	  we	  must	  use	  definite	  descriptions:	  	  (7) A	  bobcat	  looked	  and	  opened	  its	  mouth.	  	  The	  bobcat	  jumped	  toward	  the	  eaglet	  that	  was	  bouncing	  down	  the	  cliff.	  	  So	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  English	  passage	   (6)	  does	  not	   convey	  a	  meaning	  with	   intended	  coreference	  emerges	  from	  	  scalar	  conversational	  logic.	  	  Because	  a	  competor	  (7)	  that	  expresses	  coreference	  is	  available	  and	  not	  used,	  it	  is	  inferred	  that	  the	  encoder	  of	  the	  passage	   intends	   to	   convey	   a	  meaning	  with	   non-­‐coreference	   (i.e.	   where	   the	   eaglet	  that	  was	  kicked	  is	  different	  from	  the	  eaglet	  that	  bounced	  down).	  	  	  	  If	  we	  go	  back	  to	  the	  picture	  semantics	  (5),	  the	  reader	  does	  fill	  in	  the	  information	  that	  the	   eagle	   that	   bounced	   down	   is	   the	   same	   as	   the	   eagle	   that	   was	   kicked,	   and	   the	  author	  indends	  for	  her	  to	  do	  so.	  	  This	  is	  not	  blocked	  because	  there	  is	  no	  competing	  picture	  that	  indicates	  coreference-­‐-­‐-­‐there	  is	  no	  option	  of	  adding	  	  “morphology”	  that	  expresses	  definiteness,	  at	  least	  in	  Tanaka’s	  manga	  practice.	  The	   identities	   that	   are	   “filled	   in”	   have	   the	   status	   of	   pragmatic	   enrichment.	   	   I	  understand	  this	  to	  be	  information	  that	   is	  added	  conjunctively	  to	  literal	  meaning	  in	  constructing	  the	  discourse	  representation	  for	  a	  passage.	  	  	  A	  linguistic	  example	  is	  the	  implication	  in	  (8)	  that	  the	  key	  was	  used	  to	  open	  the	  door.	  	  	  This	  is	  standardly	  held	  to	  be	  a	  pragmatic	  enrichment,	  rather	  than	  an	  entailment	  of	  literal	  content.	  (8) He	  took	  out	  a	  key	  and	  opened	  the	  door.	  For	   a	   closer	   analogy	   in	   natural	   language	   semantics,	   we	   can	   look	   to	   grammatical	  categories	   for	   which	   there	   is	   no	   definiteness	   distinction,	   such	   as	   tensed	   verbs.	  	  Consider	  (9)	  as	  analyzed	  in	  event	  semantics,	  where	  an	  existentially	  quantified	  event	  variable	   is	   introduced	   for	   each	   verb.	   	   This	   results	   in	   a	   discourse	   representation	  along	   the	   lines	   of	   (10),	   where	   there	   are	   two	   stripping-­‐down	   event	   discourse	  referents.	   	   	   Let	   us	   look	   first	   at	   what	   happens	  with	   the	   discourse	   referent	   x3	   that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  pronoun	  that	  is	  the	  object	  of	  the	  second	  occurrence	  of	  stripped.	  	  In	  the	  standard	  version	  of	  DRT	  that	  is	  employed	  in	  (10),	  this	  pronoun	  introduces	  a	  fresh	  discourse	  referent,	  but	  it	  is	  part	  of	  the	  conventional	  meaning	  of	  a	  pronoun	  that	  discourse	   referent	   must	   be	   equated	   with	   some	   antecedent,	   here	   the	   discourse	  referent	  x1	   for	  the	  engine	  (Kamp	  and	  Reyle	  1993).	   	  There	   is	  also	  a	   fresh	  discourse	  referent	   e3	   for	   the	   event	   argument	   of	   the	   second	   occurrence	   of	   stripped	   down.	  	  Because	   this	   verb	   is	   not	   morphologically	   definite,	   there	   is	   nothing	   in	   the	  morphology	   or	   syntax	   that	   prompts	   identifying	   e3	   with	   another	   event	   discourse	  referent.	   	   But	   we	   understand	   the	   stripping	   down	   event	   that	   is	   a	   witness	   for	   the	  second	  sentence	  to	  be	  the	  same	  as	  the	  stripping	  down	  event	  that	  is	  a	  witness	  for	  the	  first.	   	  This	  incremental	   information	  has	  the	  status	  of	  a	  pragmatic	  enrichment.	   	   In	  a	  model	  where	   such	   enrichments	   are	  written	   into	   the	  discourse	   representation,	   the	  
equation	  in	  (11)	  should	  be	  added.	  	  	  This	  process	  is	  parallel	  to	  what	  I	  said	  happened	  with	   the	  manga	  kick	  sequence,	  because	   in	   the	   literal	   semantics	   (10)	   the	  discourse	  referents	   e1	   and	   e3	   are	   distinct	   and	   independently	   quantified.	   	   	   The	   information	  (10)	   is	   compatible	  with	   the	   stripdowns	   being	   different	   or	   the	   same,	   just	   as	   (5)	   is	  compatible	  with	  the	  two	  eagles	  being	  different	  or	  the	  same.	  (9) An	  engine	  was	  stripped	  down	  and	  rebuilt.	  	  Justin	  stripped	  it	  down.	  (10) x1	  e1	  e2	  y	  x3	  e3	  engine(x1)	  	  stripdown(e1)	  theme(e1,x1)	  	  rebuild(e2)	  theme(e2,x1)	  stripdown(e3)	  agent(e3,y)	  theme(e3,x3)	  	  	  y=Justin	  	  x3=x1	  (11) e3=e1	  	  	  As	  an	  aside,	  it	  is	  interesting	  to	  check	  what	  happens	  when	  we	  fill	  in	  an	  indefinite	  in	  (9)	   in	   the	   place	   of	   the	   pronoun.	   	   In	   the	   resulting	   sentence	   (12)	   one	   can	   hardly	  understand	  the	  passage	  as	  conveying	  that	  the	  engines	  were	  the	  same,	  though	  I	  guess	  one	  can	  understand	  that	   it	   is	  an	  open	  question	  whether	   they	  are.	   	  So	  even	   though	  the	  pair	  of	  discourse	   referents	  x3,x1	   in	   (13)	  are	   isomorphic	   to	   the	  event	  discourse	  referents	  e1,e3	   in	  (10),	  the	  identity	  x3=x1	  can	  not	  be	  added	  as	  an	  enrichment.	   	   	  As	  I	  already	  stated,	  this	  is	  to	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  avaibality	  of	  a	  competing	  sentence	  with	  a	  definite	  nominal.	  	  (12) An	  engine	  was	  stripped	  down	  and	  rebuilt.	  	  Justin	  stripped	  an	  engine	  down.	  (13) 	  	  	  x1	  e1	  e2	  y	  x3	  e3	  engine(x1)	  	  stripdown(e1)	  theme(e1,x1)	  	  rebuild(e2)	  theme(e2,x1)	  stripdown(e3)	  agent(e3,y)	  theme(e3,x3)	  y=Justin	  engine(x3)	  	  I	   think	   in	   (14)	   the	   engine	   discourse	   referents	   can	   be	   understood	   with	   enriched	  coreference.	  	  Perhaps	  somehow	  the	  counterpart	  (15)	  with	  a	  definite	  does	  not	  block	  coreference	  by	  enrichment	  in	  (14),	  because	  the	  discourse	  structure	  is	  different.	   	  In	  (14),	   the	   second	   sentence	   is	   perceived	   as	   a	   restatement	   and	   strengthening	   of	   the	  first.	  	  (14) 	  An	  engine	  was	  stripped	  down	  and	  rebuilt.	   	   Justin	  stripped	  an	  engine	  down,	  and	  Keisha	  rebuilt	  it.	  (15) An	  engine	  was	  stripped	  down	  and	  rebuilt.	  	  Justin	  stripped	  it	  down,	  and	  Keisha	  rebuilt	  it.	  	  Returning	   to	   the	  main	   argument,	  we	   have	   seen	   that	   in	   the	   satisfaction	   conditions	  that	  fall	  out	  of	  the	  geometric	  semantics	  for	  pictures,	  as	  extended	  in	  a	  simple	  way	  to	  a	  semantics	   for	  picture	   sequences,	   variables	   for	   agents	   and	  objects	   in	   the	  described	  
situations	   are	   existentially	   quantified.	   	   When	   there	   is	   understood	   co-­‐reference	  across	   panels,	   this	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   pragmatic	   enrichment.	   	   On	   this	   analysis	   co-­‐reference	   in	   comics	   is	   “purely	   pragmatic”.	   	   	   This	   is	   different	   from	   nominals	   in	  English,	  but	  is	  parallel	  to	  what	  is	  seen	  for	  tensed	  verbs	  in	  English.	  	  	  The	  pictorial	  and	  natural	   language	   data	   are	   both	   covered	   by	   the	   hypothesis	   that	   existentially	  quantified	   variables	   or	   discourse	   referents	   in	   the	   literal	  meaning	   can	   be	   enriched	  with	  added	  identities	  among	  discourse	  referents,	  as	  long	  as	  this	  is	  not	  blocked	  by	  a	  competing	  representation	  with	  a	  definite.	  	  
4.	  A	  DRT	  formalism	  for	  pictures	  One	   can	   take	   some	   steps	   toward	   formalizing	   these	   ideas	   by	   designing	   a	   DRT-­‐like	  notation	  for	  the	  discourse	  semantics	  of	  pictures.	  	  The	  main	  issue	  is	  how	  to	  introduce	  discourse	   referents.	   In	   discourse	   representation	   theory	   for	   natural	   language,	  discourse	  referents	  are	  variable-­‐like	  objects	  that	  are	  projected	  from	  syntax,	  and	  that	  at	   the	  DRT	  level	  serve	  as	  arguments	   for	  predicates	  mapped	  from	  natural-­‐language	  content	  words	  such	  as	  nouns	  and	  verbs	  (Kamp	  1981,	  Kamp	  and	  Reyle	  1994).	  	  In	  the	  semantics	  for	  DRT,	  discourse	  referents	  are	  mapped	  to	  individuals	  using	  assignment	  functions.	   	   It	   is	  hard	  to	  state	  an	  analogue	  to	  any	  of	  this	  in	  the	  geometric	  semantics	  for	   pictures.	   	   For	   instance,	   in	   the	   geometric	   semantics	   for	   pictures,	   there	   are	   no	  predicates	  that	  a	  discourse	  referent	  could	  be	  an	  argument	  of.	  My	   strategy	   is	   to	   introduce	   discourse	   referents	   at	   the	   level	   pictures.	  Discourse	   referents	   will	   be	   constructed	   out	   of	   areas	   in	   a	   picture.	   	   The	  image	  at	   the	  right	   is	  a	  panel	   from	  Gon	  with	  a	  contiguous	  area	  shaded	   in	  pink.	   	   The	   image	   was	   obtained	   in	   a	   photo	   manipulation	   program	   by	  tracing	  out	  a	  closed	  curve.	  Areas	  are	  used	  in	  photo-­‐manipulation	  software	  to	   make	   semantically	   significant	   changes,	   such	   as	   putting	   someone	   in	   a	   different	  environment,	  or	  changing	  the	  color	  of	  a	  model’s	  shoes.	   	  Here	  areas	  of	  pictures	  are	  used	   in	   a	   construction	   of	   discourse	   referents.	   	   To	   construct	   a	   discourse	  representation,	  one	  distinguishes	  some	  areas	  within	  each	  picture	  in	  the	  sequence	  of	  pictures	   that	   constitutes	   the	   pictorial	   narrative.	   	   Identities	   between	   discourse	  referents	  are	  then	  formal	  identity	  predications	  between	  the	  areas.	  	  The	  image	  at	  the	  right	   represents	   the	   process	  schematically.	   	   Some	   areas	   !! ,	  !! ,…,	  !!, !! ,…	   in	   the	   sequence	   of	  panels	   are	   distinguished.	   These	  areas	   are	   geometric.	   	   To	   assure	  that	   discourse	   referents	   for	  different	   panels	   are	   distinct,	  discourse	   referents	   are	  constructed	   as	   pairs	   of	   a	   panel	  index	   and	   an	   area.	   	   	   Then	   co-­‐references	   are	   stated	   as	   syntactic	  identities	   between	   such	   discourse	  referents,	   for	   instance	   2,!! =1,!! .	  	  These	  conditions	  are	  of	  the	  
same	  nature	  as	  the	  identity	  conditions	  used	  in	  DRT	  for	  natural	  language.	  	  But	  aside	  from	  these	  conditions,	  there	  are	  no	  formulas	  in	  the	  discourse	  representation.	  In	   the	   semantics	   for	   DRT,	   discourse	   referents	   are	   mapped	   to	   the	   model	   with	  assignment	   functions.	   	   On	   this	   account	   the	   identity	   	   ! = ! 	  in	   a	   discourse	  representation	  structure	  is	  satisfied	  with	  respect	  assignment	  g	  if	  and	  only	  if  !(!) =!(!).	   	  Here	   the	  objects	   that	  are	  assessed	   for	   identity	  are	   individuals	   in	   the	  model.	  	  The	  trick	  now	  is	  that	   in	  pictorial	  discourse	  representations,	  the	  projection	  relation	  already	  provides	  a	  kind	  of	  mapping	  to	  the	  model.	  	  In	  Panel	  1	  in	  the	  example,	  if	  with	  respect	   to	   viewpoint	   v	   the	   area	  !!	  corresponds	   to	   an	   individual	   x	   in	   scene	    σ,	   it	   is	  because	   lines	   drawn	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   through	   the	   area	  !!	  in	   the	   picture	   plane	  intersect	  x	  before	  they	  intersect	  any	  other	  object.	   	  We	  want	  to	  say	  roughly	  that	  the	  object	  picked	  out	  in	  σ	  by	  the	  area	  a	  in	  the	  picture	  plane	  of	  v	  is	  the	  object	  x	  such	  that	  any	   ray	   drawn	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   v	   through	   a	   instersects	   x	   before	   any	   other	  object.	  There	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  problems	  with	  this.	   	  Consider	  a	  shoe	  box	  (including	  a	  cover)	  that	   is	   tipped	   towards	   the	   viewpoint,	   so	   that	   only	   the	   cover	   is	   visible	   from	   the	  viewpoint.	   	   Then	   a	   ray	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   through	   a	   certain	   point	   in	   the	   picture	  plane	  that	  intersects	  the	  cover	  also	  intersects	  the	  shoe	  box.	  	  Is	  it	  the	  shoe	  box	  or	  the	  shoe	  box	  cover	   that	   is	  picked	  out	  by	   the	  discourse	   referent?	  Consider	  a	  picture	  of	  Gon	   underwater.	   	   A	   ray	   in	   the	   direction	   of	   Gon	   intersects	   the	   water	   before	   it	  intersects	  Gon.	  	  So	  how	  can	  Gon	  be	  picked	  out	  by	  a	  discourse	  referent	  constructed	  as	  an	  area?	  Consider	  a	  picture	  of	  a	  polar	  bear	   in	  a	  snowstorm.	  The	  polar	  bear	  can	  be	  made	  out,	  but	  for	  most	  points	  in	  the	  picture	  within	  the	  outline	  of	  the	  polar	  bear,	  one	  can’t	  tell	  whether	  they	  are	  within	  a	  projection	  of	  some	  fur	  of	  the	  polar	  bear,	  or	  of	  a	  snowflake.	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  issues	  of	  cross-­‐identification	  of	  individuals	  through	  time.	  	  	  The	  water	   and	   air	   in	   a	   tornado	   is	   exchanged	   continuously,	   but	   the	   tornado	   persists	  through	  time.	   	   	  To	  assess	   the	  truth	  of	  an	  equality	  condition	  on	  discourse	  referents	  constructed	  as	  above,	  it	  matters	  whether	  we	  assess	  identity	  of	  tornadoes,	  or	  identity	  of	  masses	  of	  water	  and	  air.	  I	  think	  these	  problems	  indicate	  that	  when	  a	  reader	  infers	  identity	  between	  objects	  depicted	  in	  different	  frames	  of	  a	  visual	  narrative,	  she	  is	  not	  simply	  inferring	  identity	  between	   the	   objects	   that	   project	   to	   certain	   areas	   of	   the	   different	   frames.	   	   To	  determine	   what	   objects	   are	   picked	   out	   in	   this	   way,	   and	   to	   make	   sense	   of	   the	  identities,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  refer	  to	  a	  predicate	  such	  as	  ‘shoe	  box’,	  ‘shoe	  box	  cover’,	  ‘polar	  bear’,	  or	  ‘tornado’.	  	  While	  it	  is	  problematic	  to	  ask	  whether	  the	  object	  depicted	  in	  area	  !!	  of	  picture	  1	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  object	  depicted	  in	  area	  !!	  of	  picture	  2,	  one	  can	  un-­‐problematically	  ask	  whether	  the	  shoebox	  depicted	  in	  area	  !!	  of	  picture	  1	  is	  the	  same	  as	   the	  shoebox	  depicted	   in	  area	  !!	  of	  picture	  2.	   	  To	   implement	   this	   idea,	  predicates	  could	  be	  introduced	  as	  part	  of	  the	  identity	  predication,	  or	  as	  part	  of	  the	  discourse	  referents:	  	  	  (16) 2, !"#$!%, !! = 1, !"#$!%,!! 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(17)    2,!! =!"#$!% 1,!! .	  	  	  	  Either	  way,	  it	  is	  the	  triple	  that	  takes	  on	  the	  role	  of	  a	  discourse	  referent-­‐-­‐-­‐something	  that	  maps	  to	  an	  individual	  in	  the	  world.	  	  	  I	  will	  assume	  the	  first	  representation.	  This	  completes	  my	  formalization	  of	  a	  discourse	  representation	  notation	  for	  comics.	  	  Returning	  to	  the	  issues	  from	  the	  previous	  section,	  when	  we	  add	  formulas	  like	  (16)	  or	  (17)	  to	  a	  picture	  sequence,	  we	  get	  a	  meaning-­‐bearing	  representation	  that	  is	  true	  only	   if	   certain	   individuals	   that	   are	   mapped	   from	   the	   discourse	   referents	   are	  identical.	   	   	  As	  before,	   I	  maintain	  that	  while	  the	   identities	  are	  not	  part	  of	   the	   literal	  content	   of	   the	   comic,	   the	   representation	   including	   the	   identities	   is	   enriched	  “reading”	  of	  the	  comic	  that	  is	  intended	  by	  the	  author	  and	  recovered	  by	  the	  reader.	  	  
5.	  	  Hypotheses	  about	  indexing	  On	  the	  account	  discussed	  so	  far,	  co-­‐reference	  in	  comics	  is	  post-­‐semantic.	  In	  the	  basic	  semantic	   model,	   the	   individuals	   that	   witness	   the	   truth	   of	   different	   panels	   are	  permitted	   to	   be	   different,	   and	   unlike	   for	   nominals	   in	   English,	   there	   is	   no	  morphological	  phenomenon	  of	  definiteness	  that	  prompts	  co-­‐indexing.	   	   	   I	  record	  all	  of	  this	  as	  a	  hypothesis.	  	  (18) Indexing	   in	   comics	   is	   not	   part	   of	   the	   basic	   representational	   or	   denotational	  mechanism.	  	  It	  is	  added	  post-­‐semantically	  (pragmatically).	  	  Now	   I	   am	   going	   to	   look	   at	   an	   alternative	   hypothesis	   that	   is	   inspired	   by	  work	   on	  indexing	  in	  vision.	  	  Z.	  Pylyshyn	  has	  proposed	  that	  in	  human	  vision,	  some	  indexing	  is	  performed	   by	   a	   low-­‐level	   system,	   and	   that	   an	   image	   is	   presented	   to	   the	   higher	  cognitive	  system	  as	  already	  indexed	  (Pylyshyn	  2003).	  	  The	  indexing	  is	  performed	  by	  geometrically-­‐based	  algorithms.	   	   For	   instance	   if	  within	   a	   short	   time	   span,	   a	  dot	   is	  presented	   in	  one	  position	  and	   then	  a	  dot	   is	  presented	   in	  a	  nearby	  position,	   this	   is	  perceived	   as	   a	   moving	   dot,	   rather	   than	   a	   dot	   disappearing	   and	   another	   dot	  appearing.	  	  As	  Pylyshyn	  has	  it,	  the	  output	  of	  the	  low-­‐level	  system	  includes	  an	  “index”	  that	   is	   instantiated	   at	   the	   two	   time	   points.	   	   While	   low-­‐level	   and	   algorithmic,	   the	  processes	  involved	  encode	  aspects	  of	  the	  geometry	  of	  vision,	  such	  as	  the	  possibility	  of	  occlusion	  of	  one	  object	  by	  another.	  	  
Could	  indexing	  in	  comics	  relate	  to	  low-­‐level	  properties	  of	  the	  image,	  	  rather	   than	   being	   post-­‐semantic?	   	   On	   the	   right	   we	   see	   adjacent	  panels	   from	   Gon	   4.	   	   Ignoring	   meaning,	   the	   images	   of	   Gon	   look	  similar	   as	   two-­‐dimensional	   patterns.	   	  Maybe	   they	   get	  matched	   up	  because	   of	   their	   similarity	   at	   this	   level,	   disregarding	   semantic	  interpretation.	   	   Some	   similar	   things	   are	   done	   in	   computer	   vision.	  Garg	   et.	   al.	   (2012)	   describe	   a	   system	   that	   finds	   picture-­‐parts	  depicting	   the	   same	   person	   in	   a	   set	   of	   images	   of	   a	   crowd.	   	   In	   the	  image	  on	  the	  right	  (quoted	  from	  Garg	  et	   al.’s	   paper),	   the	   system	   has	   found	  images	   of	   a	   girl	   in	   a	   gray	   tank	   top	  sitting	   in	   different	   postures	   at	  different	   times,	   and	   viewed	   from	  different	  vantages.	  	  The	  system	  in	  part	  uses	   picture-­‐level	   areas	   that	  correspond	   to	   body	   parts	   and	   pieces	  of	   clothing,	   and	   pixel-­‐level	   features	  that	  capture	  color	  and	  texture.	  	  	  	  	  Suppose	  it	  were	  possible	  to	  evaluate	  pictorial	  discourse	  referents	  as	  pictures,	  using	  low-­‐level	   non-­‐semantic	   features.	   	   Then	  we	   could	   state	   a	   discourse	   representation	  construction	  rule	  along	   the	   lines	  of	   ‘if	  drefs	  x	   an	  y	   are	   similar	  as	  pictures,	   add	   the	  identity	  x=y.’	  	  This	  is	  subtly	  different	  than	  the	  previous	  hypothesis	  because	  it	  has	  to	  do	   with	   similarity	   of	   the	   two-­‐dimensional	   pictures	   rather	   than	   with	   a	   pragmatic	  process-­‐-­‐-­‐or	   at	   any	   rate	   it	   refers	   to	   properties	   of	   the	   picture,	   rather	   than	   their	  semantic	  interpretation.	  	  I	  am	  going	  to	  restate	  it.	  	  Suppose	  we	  have	  a	  mathematical	  function	  s	  which	  allows	  us	  to	  evaluate	  the	  similarity	  of	  two	  pictures.	  	  ! !,! 	  is	  close	  to	  1	  if	  x	  and	  y	  are	  similar,	  and	  is	  close	  to	  0	  if	  x	  and	  y	  are	  not	  similar.	   	  Then	  we	  can	  state	  this	  default	  rule.	  	  (19) Given	  drefs	  x	  and	  y	  in	  different	  panels	  such	  that	  	  ! !,! > 0.9,	  by	  default	  add	  the	  DRS	  condition	  ! =y.	  	  	  	  If	  there	  was	  such	  a	  function	  s	  and	  if	  readers	  assumed	  such	  a	  coreference	  convention,	  it	   would	   be	   useful	   because	   the	   comic	   author	   can	   use	   it	   to	   express	   his	   intensions	  about	  coreference.	  If	  two	  drefs	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  coreferent,	  he	  draws	  them	  so	  that	  their	  similarity	  according	  to	  s	  is	  high.	  	  If	  they	  are	  not	  supposed	  to	  be	  coreferent,	  he	  draws	  them	  so	  that	  their	  similarity	  according	  to	  s	  is	  low.	  	  	  	  This	   procedure	   is	   actually	   similar	   to	   some	   default	   axioms	   used	   in	   the	   theory	   of	  discourse	  structure.	  	  Take	  the	  default	  axiom	  (20)	  governing	  temporal	  succession	  of	  the	  events	  described	  by	  juxtaposed	  clauses.	  	  
(20) If	  clause	  B	  immediately	  follows	  clause	  A,	  by	  default	  add	  a	  constraint	  that	  the	  event	  described	  by	  B	  follows	  the	  event	  described	  by	  A.	  	  The	  relevant	  thing	  about	  this	  is	  that	  it	  refers	  to	  linguistic	  form,	  namely	  to	  clause	  A	  and	   clause	   B	   being	   adjacent,	   but	   the	   change	   in	   representation	   that	   it	   creates	   is	  essentially	  semantic.	  	  	  Also,	  the	  force	  of	  “by	  default”	  is	  to	  allow	  the	  enrichment	  to	  be	  cancelled	   by	   semantic	   and	   pragmatic	   information,	   including	   considerations	   of	  plausibility.	  Default	  principles	  like	  this	  are	  used	  by	  Asher	  and	  Lascarides	  (2003)	  in	  modeling	   enriched	   information	   in	   natural	   language	   discourse.	   	   From	   this	   point	   of	  view,	  the	  two	  hypotheses	  under	  discussion	  in	  this	  section	  are	  not	  incompatible.	  	  The	  informational	   increment	   of	   equating	   discourse	   referents	   in	   different	   panels	   is	  certainly	   post-­‐semantic,	   but	   the	   default	   principles	   that	   govern	   it	   could	   involve	  features	  at	  different	  levels,	  including	  picture-­‐level	  features.	  	  	  
5.	  Group	  discourse	  referents	  	  Let	   us	   apply	   our	   discourse-­‐structural	   theory	   to	   panel	   2	   of	  Gon	  4,	  with	   Gon	   in	   the	  eagle	  nest	  with	  four	  baby	  eagles.	  	   	  To	  establish	  discourse	  referents,	  one	  area	  of	  the	  picture	   is	   distinguished	   for	   Gon,	   and	   four	   areas	   for	   the	   sibling	   birds	   are	  distinguished.	   	   Say	   the	   resulting	   discourse	   referents	   are	   2,!! 	  (Gon),	   2, !! 	  (one	  eaglet),	   2, !! 	  (another	  eaglet),	   2,!! 	  (another	  eaglet),	  and	   2, !! 	  (another	  eaglet).	  In	  panel	  31,	  the	  panel	  repeated	  on	  the	  right,	  Gon	  is	  shown	  kicking	  an	  eaglet	  out	  of	  the	  nest.	  	  Here	  two	  areas	  are	  distinguished,	  resulting	  in	  discourse	   referents	   31,!!" 	  and	   31, !!" .	   	   	   Unproblematically	   the	  two	   discourse	   referents	   for	   Gon	   can	   be	   equated,	   2,!! = 31,!!" .	   	   But	   for	   the	  eaglet	   that	   is	   kicked	   there	   is	   a	   problem:	   any	   of	   the	   equations	   31, !!" = 2, !! ,	  31, !!" = 2, !! ,	   31, !!" = 2,!! ,	   or	   31, !!" = 2, !! 	  is	   justified	   on	   grounds	   of	  consistency,	  plausibility,	  and	  simplicity	  of	  the	  semantic	  content,	  and	  on	  grounds	  of	  similarity	   of	   the	   drefs	   as	   pictures.	   	   Yet	   the	   story	   at	   this	   point	   is	   not	   perceived	   as	  incoherent	  or	  unacceptably	  indeterminate.	  	  	  Putting	   the	   panel	   into	   English	   suggests	   a	   solution.	   	   (21a)	   is	   a	   partitive,	   with	   an	  embedded	  phrase	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  plurality	  of	  four	  eaglets.	  (21b)	  is	  the	  same,	  but	  with	  a	  pronoun	  in	  the	  partitive.	  	  	  (21c)	  is	  perhaps	  most	  similar	  to	  panel	  31-­‐-­‐-­‐though	  it	   is	   overtly	   indefinite,	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   story	   it	   is	   understood	   partitively,	   as	  equivalent	  to	  (21a).	  	  (21) a.	  	  	  Gon	  kicked	  one	  of	  the	  eaglets.	  b. Gon	  kicked	  one	  of	  them.	  c. Gon	  kicked	  an	  eaglet.	  	  	  Research	  on	  plural	  reference	  in	  discourse	  representation	  has	  suggested	  that	  plural	  discourse	  referents	  can	  be	  freely	  created	  (Kamp	  and	  Reyle	  1993).	  	  In	  the	  story	  (22),	  suppose	   the	   first	   sentence	   sets	  up	  discourse	   referents	  u	   and	  v	   for	   the	  wild	   turkey	  and	  the	  Golden	  Retriever.	  	  In	  order	  to	  analyze	  the	  partitive	  in	  the	  second	  sentence,	  a	  plural	  discourse	  referent	  is	  introduced	  with	  a	  sum	  operator	  as	  in	  (23a).	  	  The	  second	  
sentence	   in	   (22)	   introduces	   a	   discourse	   referent	   x	   corresponding	   to	   “one”,	   and	   a	  group-­‐level	   discourse	   referent	   Z	   corresponding	   to	   “them”.	   	   	   (23b)	   states	   the	  semantic	  of	  the	  partitive.	  	  Z	  is	  related	  to	  its	  group-­‐level	  antecedent	  with	  the	  equation	  (23c).	  	  (22) This	  morning	  a	  Golden	  Retriever	  fought	  with	  a	  wild	  turkey	  right	  outside	  our	  house.	  	  One	  of	  them	  was	  badly	  injured,	  and	  I	  called	  the	  Cayuga	  Heights	  police.	  	  They	  weren’t	  interested,	  I	  should	  have	  called	  the	  humane	  society.	  	  	  (23) a.	  W	  =	  u+v	  b.	  ! ∈ !	  c.	  ! =!	  Creation	  of	  such	  group-­‐level	  antecedents	  is	  entirely	  “free”.	  	  Although	  in	  a	  sense	  the	  summation	   (23a)	   is	   an	   accommodation	   that	   is	   prompted	   by	   the	   need	   to	   find	   an	  antecedent	  for	  Z,	  there	  is	  no	  	  perception	  of	  disfluency.	  I	  suggest	  that	  free	  creation	  of	  group-­‐level	  discourse	  referents	  is	  an	  attribute	  of	  our	  cognitive	  machinery	  for	  representing	  narrative,	  and	  so	  is	  available	  also	  for	  pictorial	  narratives.	  	  Once	  discourse	  referents	  for	  pictorial	  narrative	  are	  in	  place,	  the	  formal	  process	   is	   the	   same.	   	   A	   plural	   discourse	   referent	   is	   created	   from	   the	   four	   bird	  referents	   in	   (24a).	   	   Then	   the	   eagle	   discourse	   referent	   in	   panel	   31	   is	   related	   to	   an	  antecedent	  using	  an	  element	  relation	  with	  the	  formula	  (24b).	  	  (24) a.	  W	  =	   2, !! + 2, !! + 2,!! + 2, !! 	  b.	   31, !!" ∈!	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  the	  linguistic	  and	  pictorial	  media.	  For	  one	  thing,	  in	  the	  pictorial	  medium	  there	  are	  no	  plural	  pronouns	  that	  prompt	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  plural	  discourse	  referents.	  	  For	  another,	  in	  the	  pictorial	  medium	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  introduce	  a	  discourse	   referent	   that	   can	  be	  witnessed	   indeterminately	  by	  a	  Golden	  Retriever	   and	   a	   wild	   turkey,	   because	   these	   animals	   look	   so	   different.	   	   But	   the	  differences	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   arising	   from	   the	   informational	   resources	   of	   the	   two	  media.	  	  We	  can	  still	  say	  that	  the	  mechanism	  of	  forming	  plural	  discourse	  referents	  is	  the	  same.	  	  There	   is	   a	   subtly	   different	   case	   that	   comes	   up	   frequently	   in	  superhero	  comics.	   	  There	  is	  an	  impostor	  (say)	  Superboy	  who	  looks	  like	   the	   real	   one,	   and	   in	   a	   panel	   depicting	   both	   the	   reader	   doesn’t	  know	   which	   is	   which.	   	   This	   is	   captured	   by	   equations	   of	   the	   form	  (25).	   	   The	   difference	   is	   that	   a	   lot	   of	   information	   is	   available	   about	   !, ! 	  (the	   real	  Superboy)	  so	  that	  it	  matters	  which	  is	  which.	  	  (25) a.	  W	  =	   !, !! + !, !! 	  b.	   !, ! ∈!	  	  
6.	  Further	  cases	  of	  default	  indefiniteness	  Above	  I	  discussed	  default	  semantic	  indefiniteness	  in	  comics,	  and	  with	  tensed	  verbs	  in	  an	  event-­‐semantic	  analysis	  of	  natural	  language.	  	  I	  claimed	  that	  an	  analysis	  is	  well	  supported	  where	  variables	  are	  semantically	  indefinite	  (existentally	  quantified),	  and	  are	  optionally	  identified	  with	  identity	  predications.	  Another	   case	   of	   this	   comes	   up	   in	   novels	   with	   dialogue	   where	   speakers	   are	   not	  explicitly	  identified.	  	  (26)	  is	  the	  opening	  passage	  from	  William	  Gaddis’s	  JR.	  	  (26) Justice?	  –You	  get	  justice	  in	  the	  next	  world,	  in	  this	  world	  you	  have	  the	  law.	  -­‐-­‐Well	  of	  course	  Oscar	  wants	  both.	  I	  mean	  the	  way	  he	  talks	  about	  order?	  She	  drew	  back	  her	  food	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  an	  old	  man	  paddling	  by	  in	  a	  wheelchair,	  -­‐-­‐that	  all	  he’s	  looking	  for	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  order?	  -­‐-­‐Make	  the	  trains	  run	  on	  time,	  that	  was	  the…	  -­‐-­‐I’m	  not	  talking	  about	  trains,	  Harry.	  -­‐-­‐I’m	   talking	  about	   fascism,	   that’s	  where	   this	   compulsion	   for	  order	   ends	  up.	  	  The	  rest	  of	  it’s	  opera.	  -­‐-­‐No	  but	  do	  you	  know	  what	  he	  really	  wants?	  Quoted	   speech	   is	   marked	  with	   the	   dash,	   but	   speakers	   are	   not	   identified	   directly.	  	  Identifying	   the	   speakers	   is	   an	   optimization	   problem,	   using	   constraints	   involving	  alternation	   of	   speakers,	   characteristic	   diction	   of	   speakers,	   names	   used	   by	   other	  speakers,	  and	  much	  else.	   	  Readers	  report	  that	  they	  work	  out	  the	  cast	  of	  characters	  over	  a	  couple	  of	  hundred	  pages	  of	  the	  700-­‐page	  novel.	  	  The	  speakers	  in	  the	  passage	  above	  turns	  out	  to	  include	  two	  aged	  aunts	  whose	  roles	  as	  speakers	  here	  can	  not	  be	  distinguished.	  Arguably	   the	   literal	   content	   of	   the	   passage	   is	   along	   the	   lines	   of	   (27),	   where	   the	  speakers	   are	   existentially	   quantified.	   	   Then	   speakers	   are	   cross-­‐identified	   using	  predications	  of	  identity	  and	  membership.	  (27) Someone	  said	  “You	  get	   justice	   in	  the	  next	  world,	   in	  this	  world	  you	  have	  the	  law.”	  Someone	   said	   “Well	   of	   course	   Oscar	   wants	   both.	   I	   mean	   the	   way	   he	   talks	  about	  order?”,	  drew	  back	  her	  food	  from	  the	  threat	  of	  an	  old	  man	  paddling	  by	  in	  a	  wheelchair,	  and	  said	  “that	  all	  he’s	  looking	  for	  is	  some	  kind	  of	  order?”	  Someone	  said	  “Make	  the	  trains	  run	  on	  time,	  that	  was	  the…”	  Someone	  said	  “I’m	  not	  talking	  about	  trains,	  Harry.”	  Someone	   said	   “I’m	   talking	   about	   fascism,	   that’s	   where	   this	   compulsion	   for	  order	  ends	  up.	  	  The	  rest	  of	  it’s	  opera.”	  Someone	  said	  “No	  but	  do	  you	  know	  what	  he	  really	  wants?”	  More	  controversial	   is	   the	  analysis	  of	   languages	  such	  as	  Mandarin	  Chinese	  without	  overt	  definitnes	  marking.	  	  Below	  is	  a	  decoration	  of	  the	  kicking	  passage	  with	  Chinese	  glosses.	   	   	  The	  nominals	  are	  bare,	  without	  a	  definite	  or	   indefinite	  determiners.	   	  We	  could	  say	  that	  there	  is	  a	  hidden	  definiteness	  distinction	  (in	  LF).	  	  But	  conceivably	  we	  could	   also	   say	   that	   the	   nominals	   are	   all	   indefinitely	   quantified,	   like	   discourse	  referents	  in	  comics,	  the	  events	  described	  by	  tensed	  verbs	  in	  English,	  or	  speakers	  in	  
Gaddis’s	  novels.	   	   Judging	  by	  the	  cases,	  nothing	  would	  “go	  wrong”	  on	  an	  existential	  analysis,	  because	  coreference	  can	  be	  introduced	  pragmatically.	  
	  	  	  
7.	  Conflated	  narrative	  Dehija	  (1997)	  discusses	  data	  where	  contrary	  to	  what	  was	  seen	  above,	  coreference	  across	   temporally	   separated	   depicted	   events	   is	   stipulated	   in	   the	   “syntax”	   of	  narrative	  pictures.	   	   This	   comes	  where	  different	   panels	   effectively	   overlap	   in	  what	  Dehija	  labels	  “conflated”	  narrative.	  	  	  The	   narrative	   statue	   on	   the	   right	   depicts	  some	   events	   in	   the	   life	   of	   Dipankara,	   an	  incarnation	   of	   the	   Buddha.	   	   First	   Sumedha	  (the	   leftmost	   figure	   marked	   with	   red)	   buys	  some	  lotuses.	   	  Then	  Sumedha	  (the	  top	  figure	  marked	   with	   red)	   tosses	   the	   lotuses	   at	  Dipankara	   (marked	   with	   blue).	   	   Finally	  Sumedha	   (at	   the	   bottom	   marked	   with	   red)	  bows	  down	  and	  spreads	  his	  hair	  on	  the	  ground	  for	  Dipankara	  to	  step	  on.	  	  Sumedha	  is	  depicted	  once	   in	  each	  “panel”,	  but	  Dipankara	   is	  depicted	   just	  once.	   	  One	  can	  say	  that	  image	  of	  Dipankara	  is	  part	  of	  two	  overlapping	  panels,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  just	  one	  discourse	  referent	  for	  Dipankara.	  	  As	  a	  result	  there	  is	  no	  issue	  of	  equating	  discourse	  
referents	   (or	   not)	   across	   temporally	   separated	   events.	   	   	   In	   this	   way,	   coindexing	  across	  temporally	  separated	  events	  is	  encoded	  in	  the	  syntax	  of	  the	  sculpture.	  In	  English,	  coreference	  can	  be	  stipulated	  in	  this	  way	  using	  relative	  clauses,	  and	  other	  constructions.	  	  	  Just	  like	  the	  conflated	  sculpture,	  sentence	  (28)	  conveys	  syntactically	  that	  the	  individual	  at	  whom	  the	  lotuses	  were	  thrown	  is	  the	  individual	  before	  whom	  Sumedha	   bowed	   down.	   	   	   The	   relative	   clause	   construction	   stipulates	   coreference	  between	  the	  head	  of	  the	  relative	  clause	  and	  the	  trace	  position	  in	  the	  relative	  clause.	  	  	  (28) Sumedha	   bowed	   down	   and	   spread	   his	   hair	   before	   a	  man	   to	  whom	   he	   had	  thrown	  some	  lotuses.	  To	  fill	  out	  the	  proportion,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  Dipankara	  statue	  stands	  in	  the	  same	  relation	  to	  a	  pair	  of	  sculptures	  without	  overlap	  as	  the	  relative	  clause	  sentence	  (28)	  stands	  to	  a	  variant	  (29)	  with	  separate	  clauses	  and	  two	  indefinites.	  (29) Sumedha	  threw	  some	  lotuses	  at	  a	  man.	  	  Sumedha	  bowed	  down	  before	  a	  man.	  	  
8.	  Conclusion	  This	  paper	  looked	  at	  co-­‐indexing	  across	  panels	  in	  silent	  visual	  narratives.	  	  It	  falls	  out	  of	   a	   geometric	   account	   of	   the	   semantics	   of	   pictures	   that	   depicted	   objects	   are	  existentially	   quantified.	   	   Nevertheless,	   readers	   identify	   individuals	   across	   panels,	  without	  any	  morphological	  cue.	  	  The	  same	  phenomenon	  shows	  up	  in	  event	  variables	  of	  tensed	  verbs,	  and	  in	  the	  identity	  of	  speakers	  for	  quoted	  dialogue	  in	  some	  novels.	  My	  account	  was	  formalized	  in	  an	  adaptation	  of	  discourse	  representation	  theory.	  From	   the	   standpoint	   of	   the	   semantics	   and	   pragmatics	   of	   natural	   language,	   visual	  narratives	  are	  startlingly	  different	  and	  startlingly	  familiar.	   	  Here	  I	  emphasized	  that	  coindexing	  is	  achieved	  without	  marking	  in	  morphology	  or	  syntax,	  and	  that	  depicted	  objects	   are	   in	   effect	   existentially	   quantified.	   	   This	   raises	   the	   question	  whether	   an	  existential	  analysis	  might	  be	  applicable	  to	  more	  cases	   in	  natural	   language	  than	  we	  usually	   think.	   	   Just	  as	   interesting	   is	  evidence	  that	   there	  are	  principles	  of	  discourse	  representation	  that	  cut	  across	  multiple	  media.	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